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Executive Summary
There is significant concern among policymakers about the 
health of the Initial Public Offering (IPO) market. From 1980–2000, 
an average of 298 domestic operating companies went public in 
the United States each year, but from 2001–2011, the number 
of new listings fell to an average of only ninety per year.1 Despite 
the acknowledged importance of stock markets in raising capital 
for newly listed firms, there has been surprisingly little research 
examining the impact of these newly listed entrepreneurial firms on 
the U.S. economy in terms of revenues or employment. This report 
examines the employment and revenue growth performance of all 
domestic operating companies undertaking an IPO on American 
markets from June 1996, when the SEC’s EDGAR site started 
making IPO prospectuses available online, through 2010. 
During this period, according to our definitions, 2,766 
domestic operating companies went public. These 2,766 companies 
employed 5.062 million people prior to going public and 7.334 
million in 2010, an increase of 2.272 million employees, or  
45 percent. This increase in post-IPO employment works out to 
822 jobs added per firm. Note that, in contrast to the conventional 
wisdom, most of the jobs were created prior to the IPO. In dollars of 
2011 purchasing power, in the aggregate these 2,766 companies 
had $1.32 trillion in annual sales in the year before going public, 
and $2.58 trillion in sales in fiscal 2010, a 96 percent increase. 
Inflation-adjusted revenue grew faster than employment due to high 
productivity growth. The average company going public raised  
$162 million in inflation-adjusted proceeds, not including an 
additional $27 million raised by selling shareholders. Since the 
average company going public created 822 jobs after the IPO, 
on average every job required an investment of approximately 
$200,000. 
In addition to reporting the employment and revenue growth 
for all companies going public, we categorize firms into emerging 
growth companies (“EGCs”), which we define as domestic operating 
companies less than thirty years old that are not spinoffs, rollups, 
buyouts, or demutualizations; and other companies (from here on, 
“others”).2 The aggregate employment for the subset of 1,700 
EGCs increased from 651,000 employees prior to the IPO to 1.666 
million employees in 2010, a 156 percent increase. For these EGCs, 
aggregate pre-IPO annual sales increased from an inflation-adjusted 
$134 billion to $481 billion in 2010, a 259 percent increase. Among 
the EGCs, growth was not uniform. There were standout performers, 
particularly in technology, such as Amazon, eBay, and Google, and 
in retail, such as Texas Roadhouse, that are responsible for outsized 
returns. The 1,066 other non-EGC IPOs, which are frequently larger 
companies, are responsible for employing more than 5.6 million 
people and generating $2.1 trillion in annual revenue in 2010, 
although most of their employees were hired prior to going public. 
We also examine the fate of all of the EGCs going public. Ten 
years after the IPO, only 29 percent of the EGCs from 1996–2000 
remained as independent public companies. Of those that do not 
survive, being acquired is much more common than going bankrupt. 
The survival rates, however, differ markedly by industrial sector. 
In geographic terms, there is an extraordinary concentration 
of firms making IPOs in certain states. California is the home to 
46 percent of all EGC IPOs, while Massachusetts has the highest 
per-capita number of EGC IPOs. While New York and Texas also have 
significant numbers of EGC IPOs, on a per-inhabitant basis they are 
not as impressive. Within states, there are regions—in particular, the 
San Francisco Bay Area and Greater Boston—that exhibit extremely 
high concentrations of EGC IPOs. 
While aggregate statistics reporting revenue or employment 
increases provide valuable insights, there are particular firms in our 
population, such as Amazon, eBay, and Google, that are examples of 
Schumpeterian innovation, whereby a firm or group of firms can lead 
reorganizations of entire economic sectors. Their influence cannot be 
reduced to their internal performance.
1.  Throughout this report, we exclude all foreign companies going public in the United States, banks and S&Ls (most of which are 
conversions from mutual companies), Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), closed-end funds, limited partnerships, IPOs with an offer 
price below $5 per share, unit offers, small best efforts offers, and Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs).
2. Our definition of emerging growth companies differs from the definition used in the 2012 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) 
Act. This bill defines EGCs to be any company with annual revenue of less than $1 billion. Ninety-three percent of June 1996–December 
2010 domestic operating company IPOs, excluding penny stocks and unit offers, had inflation-adjusted sales of less than $1 billion. In 
contrast to the 93 percent of IPOs that qualify as EGCs using the Congressional bill’s definition, only 61 percent (1,700/2,766) of IPOs in 
this report are classified as EGCs. Our definition of EGCs includes Google and Facebook, which the Congressional definition excludes, 
but excludes all buyout-backed IPOs. 
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Introduction
From 1980–2000, an average of 298 domestic operating 
companies went public in the United States each year, but in 
2001–2011, this number fell to an average of only ninety per year. 
The drop has been even more severe among small company initial 
public offerings (IPOs), and has occurred in spite of a doubling 
in real GDP during this time period, which would generate an 
increase in the number of IPOs per year if the ratio of IPOs per 
unit of real GDP stayed constant. This drop in IPO activity has 
generated concern among policymakers for several reasons, and 
has led to the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, signed 
into law by President Barack Obama in April 2012. 
The first reason for concern among policymakers is that it has 
now been well established that the most significant employment 
creation has been by fast-growing firms, both in the United States 
and abroad (Acs and Mueller 2008; Audretsch and Dohse 2007; 
Bottazzi and Da Rin 2002; Henrekson and Johansson 2009). For 
rapidly growing young firms, IPOs long have been considered 
important for raising capital to fuel continued growth. 
Second, there is a widespread belief that most jobs are 
created by small companies.3 Because the drop in IPO activity has 
been most severe among small firms, policymakers have expressed 
concern that there has been an effect on aggregate employment. 
Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2012) document that the average number 
of small-company IPOs per year in 2001–2009 has fallen by 
more than 80 percent relative to the annual average during 
1980–2000.4
Third, an IPO is a key rite of passage for many entrepreneurial 
firms, and allows founders and financial backers to begin cashing 
out. Furthermore, venture capital and private equity firms normally 
are contractually mandated by their limited partners to exit their 
portfolio companies within ten to twelve years of the investment, 
and thus are motivated to either sell out or take a company public.
Finally, in addition to the direct employment effects, there is 
a perception that many companies going public, especially those 
in the biomedical and technology industries, generate positive 
externalities and consumer surplus. 
Surprisingly, there has been little prior research examining 
the impact of newly stock market-listed entrepreneurial firms on 
the U.S. economy in terms of revenues or employment. One widely 
cited study concludes that there were as many as 22.7 million job 
losses due to the shortfall of IPOs since 1996. The study bases 
this conclusion upon a “select” sample of twenty-five unidentified 
IPOs. 5
3.  David Birch was the first scholar to demonstrate the critical importance of small firms for employment and to single out the 
importance of new firms that were rapidly growing (Birch, et al., 1995). Recent work by John Haltiwanger, Ron S. Jarmin, and Javier 
Miranda (2012), “Who Creates Jobs? Small vs. Large vs. Young,” Review of Economics and Statistics, forthcoming, suggests that young 
firms, most of which are small, are net job creators, but older firms, whether large or small, are not.
4. See Table 1 of Xiaohui Gao, Jay R. Ritter, and Zhongyan Zhu (2012), “Where Have All the IPOs Gone?” They define small and large 
companies in terms of whether the inflation-adjusted (using dollars of 2009 purchasing power) sales in the last twelve months prior to 
going public is above $50 million.
5. Page 2 of David Weild and Edward Kim’s 2009 “A Wake-up Call for America” states that “Up to 22 million jobs may have been 
lost because of our broken IPO market.” On page 26, they explain the assumptions behind this number. Crucially, they assume, based 
on twenty-five “selected” IPOs since 1996, that each IPO has a 17.8 percent compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of employees 
and that the median number of employees at the time of the IPO is 1,372. They assume that the number of IPOs per year would stay 
at the 1996 peak-year level. Thus, the 1997 actual number of 569 IPOs has “234 ‘lost’ from the 1996 peak of 803 IPOs. (234)×(1,372 
employees growing at 17.8 percent for eleven years) = 1,946,113 potential jobs lost.” In other words, they assume that over ten years, 
each IPO would increase employment by (1.17810 – 1)×100 percent = 415 percent, whereas we report in Table 1 that the average ten-
year employment growth for the 1,857 IPOs from June 1996–December 2000 is 60 percent, a CAGR of 4.8 percent. Weild and Kim do 
not report which twenty-five selected IPOs they use, but they obviously have selected some of the most successful companies, and then 
assume that thousands of companies that didn’t go public would have been as large and successful as their unrepresentative group of 
twenty-five actual IPOs. On page 27, they calculate the 22.7 million number, which has been used in the IPO Task Force’s December 2011 
presentation by Kate Mitchell to the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and several Wall Street Journal 
articles. On page 27, after mentioning several caveats, Weild and Kim state, “Though 22 million may seem to be a staggering number on 
its own, we believe it is a reasonable estimate in the context of long-term historical employment growth in this country.” The number of 
1996 IPOs (803) that Weild and Kim use differs from Gao, Ritter, and Zhu’s (2012) 643 domestic operating company IPOs. The difference 
in numbers is apparently due to the inclusion by Weild and Kim of penny stocks and unit offers, as well as foreign companies going 
public in the United States (sixty-four IPOs in 1996), and bank and S&L conversions from mutual to stock ownership.
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This report examines the employment and revenue growth 
performance of all domestic operating companies that have 
made an IPO from June 1996 through 2010 in the United States. 
During this period, 2,766 domestic operating companies went 
public in the United States.6 These 2,766 companies employed 
5.062 million people prior to going public and 7.334 million in 
2010, an increase of 2.272 million employees, or 45 percent. 
This increase in post-IPO employment works out to 822 jobs per 
firm. In dollars of 2011 purchasing power, in the aggregate these 
2,766 companies had $1.32 trillion in annual sales in the year 
before going public, and $2.58 trillion in sales in fiscal 2010, a 
96 percent increase. Inflation-adjusted revenue grew faster than 
employment due to high productivity growth.
One can use our numbers, in a mechanical sense, to 
calculate the lost jobs from the slowdown in IPO activity. If the 
volume of IPOs per year during 1980–2000 had been maintained 
during 2001–2011, i.e., 298 domestic operating company 
IPOs per year rather than ninety per year, and if each of the 
208 additional IPOs per year had created 822 jobs, the 2,288 
additional IPOs would have created 1.881 million more jobs, a 
far smaller number than the 22.7 million figure that has been 
repeatedly cited. 
 There are some strong assumptions that go into the above 
calculation. First, since the number of years in which to grow 
would have been shorter than for the firms that went public in 
the late 1990s, the jobs created through 2010 probably would 
be lower. Second, there is an assumption that the average quality 
of firms going public would remain the same as those that 
actually did go public. In other words, that there would have 
been additional eBays, Amazon.coms, and Googles if there had 
just been more IPOs. Third, that the people that would have been 
hired would not have been doing something else. In other words, 
there is an implicit assumption that a mass army of would-be 
engineers, scientists, and marketing experts is sitting at home 
watching television. And fourth, that the capital invested when a 
company raises funds in an IPO would not otherwise have been 
invested in job-creating activities. The average company that 
conducted an IPO during our sample period raised $162 million 
in inflation-adjusted dollars, and if there were 2,288 more IPOs 
of the same average size, $370 billion of capital would have been 
pulled from other uses.
In addition to reporting the employment and revenue 
growth for all companies going public, we categorize firms into 
emerging growth companies (“EGCs”), which we define as 
domestic operating companies less than thirty years old that are 
not spinoffs, rollups, buyouts, or demutualizations, and others 
(from here on, “others”).7 The aggregate employment for the 
subset of 1,700 EGCs increased from 651,000 employees prior to 
the IPO to 1.666 million employees in 2010, a 156 percent 
increase. For these EGCs, aggregate pre-IPO annual sales 
increased from an inflation-adjusted $134 billion to $481 billion 
in 2010, a 259 percent increase. Not surprisingly, these younger 
and smaller companies on average grew faster than other 
companies going public. The 1,066 other IPOs increased 
employment by only 29 percent and revenue by 78 percent. 
We assess performance over three, five, and ten years, and 
through 2010, to provide a better understanding of not only the 
short-run, but also the longer-run impacts. Measuring the longer-
run impacts is vitally important, because the large-scale benefits 
and societally significant measures of success can take a decade 
or longer to appear. 
Most of the employment growth occurs in the first five years 
after the IPO. For the 2,354 IPOs from 1996–2005, in the first 
five years after going public, the aggregate number of employees 
6. Throughout this report, we exclude all foreign companies going public in the United States, banks and S&Ls (most of which are 
conversions from mutual companies), Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), closed-end funds, limited partnerships, IPOs with an offer 
price below $5 per share, unit offers, small best efforts offers, and Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs).
7. Our definition of emerging growth companies differs from the definition used in House of Representatives bill 3606 or Senate bill 
1933, the “Reopening American Capital Markets to Emerging Growth Companies Act of 2011.” These bills define EGCs to be any 
company with annual revenue of less than $1 billion. Ninety-three percent of June 1996–December 2010 domestic operating company 
IPOs, excluding penny stocks and unit offers, had inflation-adjusted sales of less than $1 billion (January 2011 purchasing power, using 
the CPI). In contrast to the 93 percent of IPOs that qualify as EGCs using the Congressional bills’ definition, only 61 percent (1,700/2,766) 
of IPOs in this report are classified as EGCs. Our definition of EGCs includes Google and Facebook, which the Congressional definition 
excludes, but excludes all buyout-backed IPOs.
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increased by 39 percent, a compound annual growth rate of  
6.7 percent. When we restrict our analysis to the 1,857 com-
panies that went public during June 1996–December 2000, 
combined employment grew by 60 percent over the following 
decade, a compound annual growth rate of 4.8 percent. For 
the EGCs that went public during this period, their combined 
employment grew by 161 percent, a compound annual growth 
rate of 10.1 percent.
In this report, we examine various aspects of these firms 
in more detail. While we do report data for the other firms, the 
greatest attention is given to the EGCs, as they are, often, the 
firms that create Schumpeterian growth. For certain of these 
firms, such as Amazon, eBay, Google, Salesforce.com, and 
Yahoo!, their impacts extend far beyond either their employment 
or revenue growth and create entirely new economic 
ecosystems. These impacts are difficult to capture statistically. 
methodology and assumptions
We include this brief methodology and assumption section 
here, but attach an Appendix with greater detail. All of the data 
reported in this study are taken from SEC filings related to the 
IPO, later annual reports, and delisting filings (though identify-
ing the reasons for delisting sometimes required further Internet 
searches) for emerging growth company IPOs, but Compustat is 
the primary data source for the other company IPOs. All IPO data 
are taken from the final prospectus filed prior to the IPO or the 
Thomson Reuters new issues database. We include both regular 
filers and so-called small business IPOs (firms having filed an 
SEC form SB-2, rather than a form S-1, registration). The data 
include all firms filing for an IPO from June 1, 1996, through 
December 31, 2010—the period during which all IPO filings 
must be electronic (the one exception is 37 SB-2 filers, which 
were exempt from this requirement for several months after the 
June 1996 deadline; thus, we omit them).
While we examine all domestic operating companies 
undertaking an IPO, the focus of our study is upon emerging 
growth companies. Identifying and classifying these firms is 
difficult and requires judgments, all of which were based upon 
inspection of the IPO prospectus. 
Because one of our concerns is measuring the employment 
and revenue contribution of new firms, for our EGCs we exclude 
all firms that were thirty years or older at the time of the IPO. 
In some respects, this is arbitrary, but it does serve to focus our 
attention on newer firms. This exclusion meant that most very 
large firms (at the time of the IPO) are excluded from the EGC 
analysis. For example, one of the largest firms that went public 
during our sample period is United Parcel Service (UPS), founded 
in 1907, which could hardly be considered a new entrepreneurial 
firm.
Acquisitions and Bankruptcy Assumptions
For every firm, we identify the firm’s fate, which has three 
possibilities: 1) it continued to exist as a publicly traded firm 
on December 2010, 2) it no longer existed due to bankruptcy 
or a distress delisting, or 3) it no longer existed because it was 
acquired by another entity or went private and was no longer 
publicly listed. One caveat is that some mergers and acquisitions 
are roughly the equivalent of bankruptcy as the firm is sold for a 
trivial sum. Determining whether an acquisition is the functional 
equivalent of a bankruptcy is occasionally open to interpretation. 
To estimate the continuing employment or revenue 
contribution of firms that are either acquired or delisted, it 
is necessary to make some assumptions about their future 
performance. We assume that, after an acquisition, the number 
of employees for a firm continues to be constant for all years 
after the last available year’s data. Thus, if company A had 100 
employees pre-IPO, 150 employees at the end of its next fiscal 
year, and then was acquired, we would treat the company as 
having 150 employees in all subsequent years. If the company is 
delisted at a price of less than $2 per share and not acquired, we 
assume that the company failed and that it had zero employees in 
subsequent years. 
All bankrupt firms are assumed to be disbanded and have 
no employees, despite the fact that some of the firms or parts 
of firms may have been acquired out of bankruptcy or gone 
forward under debtor-in-possession operation. The total number 
of employees of all the bankrupt and delisted EGCs was 151,785 
persons in the last year prior to the event. Using Internet searches, 
we examined the fate of each of the largest ten bankruptcies 
and sampled another fifteen. We found the number of employees 
that were retained varied dramatically from apparently none to 
a significant percent (see Appendix 3 for detailed discussion). 
We decided not to apply an arbitrary percentage of retained 
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employees and assumed that these companies no longer had 
any employees. The assumption that firms that are delisted for 
distress reasons are liquidated imparts a downward bias to our 
growth-rate estimates.
For firms that are subsequently acquired, we assume that 
their employment and inflation-adjusted revenue is frozen at the 
last reported level prior to the event.
Another significant issue for calculating employment 
and revenue growth is when a firm in our database acquires 
another firm. Unfortunately, only in a very few cases are the 
number of employees in the acquired firm announced, and 
many acquisitions are of private firms for which no employee 
count is publicly available. In this scenario, the growth in the 
acquiring firm’s employment and revenues overstates the 
contribution to the economy’s growth. This is an unavoidable 
limitation due to the data reported. Because growth due to 
acquisitions overstates a firm’s contributions to aggregate 
employment growth, in this case our growth rate estimates may 
be overstated.
Other Definitions
A firm is considered “venture capital-financed,” if it had 
at least one self-identified venture capitalist on the board of 
directors. If a board member was affiliated with a self-identified 
private equity (buyout) firm (and there was no venture capitalist 
on the board), it was not considered a venture capital-financed 
firm. Some firms with “growth capital” financial backers are 
difficult to classify.
Each firm is identified by the primary standard industrial 
classification (SIC) code that it reported in its IPO filing. All 
addresses are for the firm’s headquarters as reported in the 
prospectus.
IPos and Employment
There has been significant recent attention devoted to the 
number of jobs created by new firms, many of the most successful 
of which file for an IPO. For each cohort year, Figure 1 shows the 
aggregate pre-IPO employment of EGCs by cohort year in tan 
(on the right) and the aggregate pre-IPO employment of other 
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Figure 1. Pre-IPO Employment by Firms Undertaking an IPO in Each Cohort Year:  
Emerging Growth Companies in Tan, Other Companies in Blue, 1996 through 2010
Kauffman Foundation
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companies in blue (on the left). In every year, the aggregate 
pre-IPO employment of other company IPOs is higher, and usually 
much higher, than for EGC IPOs.
In Panel A of Table 1, using all domestic operating company 
Table 1. Aggregate Employment of Domestic Operating Company IPOs
Panel A: Employment and employment growth through the end of fiscal 2010
 Emerging Growth Other Total
All IPOs from June 1996–Dec. 2010 N=1,700 N=1,066 N=2,766 
Pre-IPO Employment  651,210 4,410,394 5,061,604
Post-IPO Growth by 2010 1,014,572 1,257,836 2,272,408 
Percentage Growth  156%  29%  45%
Total in 2010 1,665,782 5,668,230 7,334,012
Panel B: Employment and employment growth through the end of the third anniversary
IPOs from June 1996–Dec. 2007 N=1,635 N=994 N=2,629 
Pre-IPO Employment   606,452 3,859,762 4,466,214
Post-IPO Growth 3 Years after IPO  699,118  903,490 1,602,608 
Percentage Growth  115%  23%  36%
Compound Annual Growth Rate  29.1%  7.3%  10.8%
Total 3 Years after IPO 1,305,570 4,763,252 6,068,822
Panel C: Employment and employment growth through the end of the fifth anniversary
IPOs from June 1996–Dec. 2005 N=1,487 N=867 N=2,354 
Pre-IPO Employment   547,128 3,411,660 3,958,788
Post-IPO Growth 5 years after IPO  739,079  785,493 1,524,572 
Percentage Growth   135%  23%  39%
Compound Annual Growth Rate  18.6%  4.2%  6.7%
Total 5 years after IPO 1,286,207 4,197,153 5,483,360
Panel D: Employment and employment growth through the end of the tenth anniversary
IPOs from June 1996–Dec. 2000 N=1,245 N=612 N=1,857 
Pre-IPO Employment    437,934 1,981,661 2,419,595
Post-IPO Growth 10 years after IPO  704,266  743,108 1,447,374
Percentage Growth    161%  37%  60%
Compound Annual Growth Rate  10.1%  3.2%  4.8% 
Total 10 years after IPO 1,142,200 2,724,769 3,866,969
Pre-IPO employment is the number of employees listed in the prospectus. Employment in year +t is the employment (usually from the 10-K 
report) t years after the year of the IPO. For example, year +3 is fiscal year 2004 for IPOs from 2001. If a company was delisted for bad reasons 
(e.g., failure to meet nasdaq’s net capital requirements) and stopped filing financial statements, we assume that employment fell to zero and 
stayed there. If a company is acquired, we assume that its employment is frozen at the last available number.
IPOs from June 1996–December 2010, we report the aggregate 
pre-IPO employment of EGC IPOs, other IPOs, and all IPOs. The 
aggregate numbers confirm what is visually shown in Figure 1: 
EGC IPOs comprise a relatively small fraction of the aggregate 
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8. For example, the April 7, 2012, Wall Street Journal has an interview with Kate Mitchell, “How Silicon Valley Won in Washington,” 
about the JOBS Act (Freeman, 2012). The article states, without questioning, “To sell politicians on the benefits of allowing startups to 
grow into public companies, the [IPO] task force pointed to research showing that, when such firms go public, more than 90 percent of 
job creation happens after the IPO.” For the EGCs, 61.7 percent of the employment ten years out was created after the IPO  
(a 161 percent increase, not a 900 percent increase), and for all IPOs, 37.4 percent of the employment was created after the IPO  
(a 60 percent increase).
9. On page 4 of the 2011 edition, the statement is made that, “IHS Global Insight research suggests that 92 percent of job growth 
by young companies occurs after their initial public offerings.” No further details are given. It is possible that the 92 percent number is 
calculated from a subsample of extremely successful venture capital-backed companies, and then this number is applied to all venture-
backed IPOs or all IPOs. IHS is an advisory, consulting, and forecasting firm.
Traditionally, one of the most important purposes of an IPO is 
to raise capital to finance firm growth. The IPO also provides liquidity 
for investors and firm insiders that can sell their stakes in the firm 
either at the time of the IPO or later on in open market or follow-on 
transactions. For venture capitalists, this is especially important as 
it completes what Gompers and Lerner (1999) term the “venture 
capital cycle.” In Figure 2, for EGCs, we show the cumulative amount 
of employment provided by the firms from each cohort. 
Figure 2. Employment at the Time of the IPO and Post-IPO Employment by Cohort Year,  
Emerging Growth Company IPOs, 1996–2010
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Kauffman Foundation
pre-IPO employment of all IPOs: 651,000 jobs out of 5,061,000 
total jobs, 13 percent of the total. Inspection of Panels C and D 
of Table 1 shows that the percentage growth in employment per 
year is fastest immediately after the IPO, possibly reflecting the 
cash infusion associated with the IPO.
In Panel D of Table 1, using the 1,857 IPOs from June 1996–
December 2000 for which ten years of post-IPO experience is 
available, we report that the total employment increased by  
60 percent, a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of  
4.8 percent per year. The panel also reports that, for the EGCs, the 
CAGR is a much higher 10.1 percent. For the EGCs, the numbers 
also can be expressed in a manner that gives the percentage of 
2010 employment that was created after the IPO. With 1,142,200 
total employees in 2010, the 704,266 employees that were hired 
after the IPO represent 62 percent of the 2010 workforce. This 
62 percent number is in contrast to a widely quoted number that 
90 percent of job creation occurs after the IPO.8 The 62 percent 
of 2010 jobs also can be expressed as post-IPO employment 
growth of 161 percent, whereas the 90 percent number implies 
an average increase of 900 percent after the IPO. The 90 percent 
number comes from the annual Venture Impact: The Economic 
Importance of Venture Capital-Backed Companies to the U.S. 
Economy report published by IHS Global Insight and paid for by 
the National Venture Capital Association.9
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Immediately after the IPO, firms normally experience rapid 
growth. This is not surprising because the capital they raised 
can be used to hire more personnel. This was especially true in 
the 1990s during the Internet Bubble, when the mantra was 
“grow rapidly or fail.” For the 1996–2000 cohorts, employment 
grew rapidly in the first few years after the IPO. As Figure 2 
shows for these cohorts, the post-2000 Bubble collapse period 
was one of significant job loss, though employment recovered 
later in the decade and in particularly dramatic fashion for the 
1996 and 1997 cohort. The phenomenon of significant growth 
post-IPO continues for cohorts that had an IPO after 2000, but 
it was far more subdued. Interestingly, after 2000 none of the 
cohorts except the 2004 cohort, which includes Google, exhibited 
especially dramatic growth. At this point, we have no explanation 
for this differential behavior of the earlier and later cohorts, but 
with fewer firms in the later cohorts, this may be explained by 
fewer opportunities for “home-run” firms.
Figure 3 shows the aggregate employment of these EGC 
IPOs over time. The contribution of the IPOs for each cohort year 
to aggregate employment in a calendar year can be found by 
following the color of that cohort year. The first number shown 
for each cohort is the aggregate pre-IPO employment for the EGC 
IPOs from this year. As Figure 3 shows, the number of employees 
grew every year except 2002 and 2009, when there was a slight 
decrease in total employment. As of 2010, these EGC IPOs from 
June 1996 through 2010 employed more than 1.66 million 
people, or 1.19 percent of all U.S. jobs (December 2010 total 
U.S. civilian employment was 139,200,000).10 After 2000, there 
have been only a small number of new EGC IPOs per year, so the 
growth in job contributions by newly public firms is fairly small.
The contribution of the 1996 and 1997 cohorts is 
remarkable because, by 2010, they provided nearly 43 percent of 
the total employment of all of the emerging growth companies 
that went public between mid-1996 and 2010. The 1999 cohort 
provided almost 13 percent, and the 2004 cohort added another 
9 percent. The 2004 cohort experienced remarkable growth, as 
it contained three firms—Google, Salesforce.com, and Texas 
Roadhouse—that experienced significant growth.
10. Firms generally do not report how many of the employees are in the United States, so we are assuming that all of the employees are 
based in the United States, which overstates the contribution to U.S. employment.
Figure 3. Annual Employment by Cohort Year, Emerging Growth Company IPOs, 1996–2010
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IPos and Revenues
In Table 2, we report the aggregate pre-IPO last twelve 
months’ revenue and aggregate annual revenue in 2010 and, 
respectively, three years, five years, and ten years after the IPO. 
All of the numbers are expressed in terms of January 2011 
purchasing power, using the Consumers Price Index (CPI). As with 
the employment numbers in Table 1, Table 2 shows that post-IPO 
revenue growth is higher in percentage terms for the EGC IPOs 
than for the other IPOs, but the larger starting values for the other 
IPOs dominate in terms of the dollar value of the increase in sales. 
Table 2 shows higher percentage growth rates for revenue than 
Table 1 showed for employment, reflecting productivity growth in 
the years after the IPO, so that revenue per employee grows, on 
average.
Table 2. Aggregate Revenue in Millions of 2011 Dollars of Domestic Operating Company IPOs
Panel A: Revenue and revenue growth through the end of fiscal 2010
 Emerging Growth Other Total
All IPOs from June 1996–Dec. 2010 N=1,700 N=1,066 N=2,766 
Pre-IPO Revenue  $133,996 $1,181,901 $1,315,897
Post-IPO Growth by 2010 $346,588 $921,454 $1,268,042 
Percentage Growth   259%  78%  96%
Total in 2010 $480,584 $2,103,355 $2,583,939
Panel B: Revenue and revenue growth through the end of the third anniversary
IPOs from June 1996–Dec. 2007 N=1,635 N=994 N=2,629 
Pre-IPO Revenue   $124,840 $993,631 $1,118,471
Post-IPO Growth 3 Years after IPO  $193,991 $533,977 $727,9688
Percentage Growth   155%  54%  65%
Compound Annual Growth Rate  36.7%  15.4%  18.2% 
Total 3 Years after IPO $318,831 $1,527,608 $1,846,439
Panel C: Revenue and revenue growth through the end of the fifth anniversary
IPOs from June 1996–Dec. 2005 N=1,487 N=867 N=2,354 
Pre-IPO Revenue   $107,301 $885,967 $993,268
Post-IPO Growth 5 years after IPO  $227,924 $623,598 $851,522
Percentage Growth   212%  70%  85%
Compound Annual Growth Rate   25.6%  11.2%  13.2%
Total 5 years after IPO $335,225 $1,509,565 $1,844,790
Panel D: Revenue and revenue growth through the end of the tenth anniversary
IPOs from June 1996–Dec. 2000 N=1,245 N=612 N=1,857 
Pre-IPO Revenue    $71,758 $465,694 $537,452
Post-IPO Growth 10 years after IPO  $212,048 $500,797 $712,845
Percentage Growth    296% 108% 133%
Compound Annual Growth Rate   14.7%  7.6%  8.8% 
Total 10 years after IPO $283,806 $966,491 $1,250,297
Pre-IPO Revenue is the twelve months of revenue prior to the IPO. All revenue is in terms of January 2011 purchasing power, using the CPI. 
Revenue in year +t is the revenue (usually from the 10-K report) t years after the year of the IPO. For example, year +3 is fiscal year 2004 
for IPOs from 2001. If a company was delisted for bad reasons (e.g., failure to meet nasdaq’s net capital requirements and stopped filing 
financial statements), we assume that revenue fell to zero and stayed there. If a company is acquired, we assume that its inflation-adjusted 
revenue is frozen at the last available number.
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At the time of the public offering, the emerging growth 
companies had far smaller revenues than the older, larger, other 
firms (see Figure 4). However, as we stated earlier, the EGCs’ 
revenues grew more quickly and, by 2010, had become quite 
significant. As reported in Table 2, aggregate annual revenues 
earned in 2010 by all the EGCs that went public from June 1996 
to December 2010 are more than $479 billion. 
Figure 5 illustrates the contribution of each cohort to the 
2010 totals for the EGCs. The aggregate revenue shown in each 
bar in Figure 5 increases over time as the cumulative number of 
IPOs increases, and as individual firms add sales after the IPO. The 
1990s, not surprisingly, were a period of dramatically increasing 
aggregate revenues as many companies went public. From 
2000–2003, annual revenue growth stagnated even as new, 
though small, cohorts entered the database. From 2004 through 
2007, annual revenues again began to increase, only to stagnate 
again in 2008 prior to 2010. As was the case with employment, 
the 2004 cohort showed dramatic growth in revenues. The 1997 
cohort also showed significant and relatively constant growth. 
Annual revenues for the 1996 cohort grew until 2001 and then 
stagnated. 
Not surprisingly, the after-IPO revenue growth is affected 
by the number and success of the firms in the cohort and the 
overall economic situation (see Figure 6). As was the case with 
employment, the 1996 and 1997 cohorts initially performed 
extremely well, but then experienced a decline during the collapse 
of the Internet Bubble and the recession of the early 2000s. 
However, revenues for the 1997 cohort, which includes  
Amazon.com, recovered quickly and powerfully. While 
employment growth slowed down for the 1999 cohort, this cohort 
still shows substantial post-Internet Bubble revenue growth. 
But the stellar performer is the 2004 cohort, which overtook the 
larger and older 1998 cohort and, likely, in 2011 overtook the 
large 1999 cohort. In large measure, this is due to the remarkable 
performance of Google and Salesforce.com.
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Figure 6. Revenue Reported for the Year of IPO and Revenue Growth Post-IPO  
by Cohort Year in Millions of 2011 Dollars, Emerging Growth Company IPOs, 1996–2010
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Figure 5. Annual Revenues for All Emerging Growth Company IPOs by Cohort in Millions of 2011 Dollars, 1996–2010
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IPo firm survival
The fate of firms making IPOs is of interest, as this is a 
measure of how many organizations undergoing an IPO survive 
and remain listed. Table 3 reports that, ten years after the IPO, 
only 29 percent of EGC IPOs were still in operation, despite the 
fact that this includes the excesses of the Internet Bubble years 
1999 and 2000 and the concomitant crash. Fifty-five percent of 
these IPOs were acquired and 16 percent failed. For EGC IPOs 
from June 1996–December 2007, 23 percent were acquired 
within three years of the IPO. Using all IPOs from 1980–2009, 
Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2012) report that 12 percent of IPOs are 
acquired within three years of the IPO, with the percentage higher 
during 1990–2009 than in the 1980s.11
The picture is somewhat different when one considers the 
status of EGCs by IPO cohort. Inspection of Table 4 shows that, if 
one examines the survival of IPO cohorts as of the end of 2010, 
11. Table 7 of “Where Have All the IPOs Gone?” by Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2012) reports that 911 out of 7,443 IPOs during 1980–2009 
were acquired within three years of the IPO. For the 50 percent of companies with less than $50 million ($2009) in pre-IPO annual sales, 
the merger rate was 6.0 percent in 1980–1989 and 14.4 percent thereafter. For the 50 percent of companies with more than $50 million 
in pre-IPO annual sales, the merger rate was 12.3 percent in 1980–1989 and 13.2 percent thereafter.
Table 3. Fate of all Emerging Growth Company IPOs: Three, Five, and Ten Years after the IPO and by 2010
Survival Period Failed Acquired Operating Total 
3 years after IPO 96 380 1,159 1,635 
1996–2007 5.9% 23.2% 70.9%
5 years after IPO 156 532 799 1,487 
1996–2005 10.5% 35.8% 53.7% 
10 years after IPO 200 683 362 1,245 
1996–2000 16.1% 54.9% 29.1%
All firms by 2010 223 869 608 1,700 
1996–2010 13.1% 51.1% 35.8%
Table 4. Fate of Emerging Growth IPO Firm by Cohort as of 2010
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Failed 54 42 31 52 30 2 0 1 3 2 3 3 0 0 0 223 13.1%
Acquired 137 157 81 208 152 14 13 15 35 20 20 17 0 0 0 869 51.1%
Operating 48 73 34 73 73 18 10 16 55 38 39 66 9 14 42 608 35.8%
Total 239 272 146 333 255 34 23 32 93 60 62 86 9 14 42 1700 100%
Percent  
Operating 20.1% 26.8% 23.3% 21.9% 28.6% 52.9% 43.5% 50.0% 59.1% 63.3% 62.9% 76.7% 100% 100% 100% 35.8%
more recent cohorts exhibit lower exit rates than older ones (this 
is to be expected, because with fewer years after the IPO, their 
cumulative risk of failure or acquisition is lower). More notable 
is the difference in survival between 2000, which was the year 
of the Internet Bubble collapse, and 2001. The 2001 cohort had 
dramatically higher survival rates (53 percent vs. 29 percent) 
than firms that undertook IPOs in earlier years. This suggests that 
the quality of firms increased substantially. The collapse of the 
Internet Bubble led to the demise of large numbers of recent IPO 
firms, suggesting that the quality of the firms may have declined 
during the Bubble (EGCs during 1999–2000 were younger than 
EGCs in other cohorts, and the survival rate of young firms is 
lower than that of older firms). It is important to note that we 
do not differentiate between normal acquisitions and distress 
acquisitions, i.e., acquisitions in which the firm was acquired at a 
price far lower than what the public paid at the IPO. In such cases, 
the public investors may have lost nearly all of their investment.
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Table 5. Firm Survival through 2010 in Percent by Industry, Emerging Growth Company IPOs
Class Operating  M&A Failed Total 
ICT 34.7% 53.0% 12.3% 398
Internet 24.9% 61.4% 13.7% 402 
Biomedical 51.0% 42.9% 6.1% 247
Services 31.1% 57.6% 11.3% 177
Manufacturing 44.8% 36.2% 19.0% 116
Retail 33.0% 48.4% 18.7% 91
Other 39.8% 43.5% 16.7% 269
Total 35.8% 51.1% 13.1% 1,700
Table 6. Firm Status Three Years after Going Public, Emerging Growth Company IPOs
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
Failed 14 12 10 36 15 0 0 0 1 2 3 3 96
Percent 5.9 4.4 6.4 10.8 5.9 0 0 0 1.1 3.3 4.8 3.5 5.9
Acquired 40 60 35 106 66 6 7 5 16 11 11 17 380
Percent 16.7 22.1 24.0 31.8 25.9 17.6 30.4 15.6 17.2 18.3 17.7 19.8 23.2
Operating 185 200 101 191 174 28 16 27 76 47 48 66 1,159
Percent 77.4 73.5 69.2 57.4 68.2 82.4 69.6 84.4 81.7 78.3 77.4 76.7 70.9
Total 239 272 146 333 255 34 23 32 93 60 62 86 1,635
Despite the popular press’ attention to the large number 
of failures of the dot-com era, acquisition (though as mentioned 
earlier many of these may have been distressed) is a far more 
likely outcome than outright failure for all cohorts. The fate 
of most Internet firms, as is the case of software and other 
information technology (IT) sectors, was acquisition. Table 5 
reports that biomedical IPOs, one of the most knowledge- and 
technology-intensive sectors, have the highest survival and 
the lowest bankruptcy rate among all of our sectors. This is 
somewhat surprising because there have been repeated claims 
that there would be a shake-out in biotechnology firms—but, 
at least for publicly listed firms, the failure rates have been quite 
low. Interestingly, the highest failure rates are in manufacturing 
and retail. While not reported here due to space considerations, 
semiconductors, another extremely knowledge-intensive industry, 
also has excellent survival rates.
The effect of the Internet Bubble on three-year firm survival 
can best be seen at its height in the 1999 and 2000 cohorts, 
whose three-year survival rates declined precipitously, though 
most of the terminations were through acquisitions (Table 6). 
Here, it is significant to note that a number of the acquisitions 
were distress sales—and easily could have led to post-acquisition 
closure. Also, some of the continuing firms now are listed on the 
thinly traded penny-stock market and have very few employees. 
In many respects, these penny-stock firms have failed in all but 
name. Survival rates for the 1996 and 1997 cohorts were high, 
probably in part because raising money was easy. In the aftermath 
of the Bubble, with the exception of 2002, firm three-year survival 
rates were extraordinarily high. This may be an expression of 
investors only being willing to buy high-quality firms.
IPos by Industry
Obviously, firms making IPOs come from many industries. 
Table 7 separates the IPOs by general industrial categories (see 
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Table A-3 for the SIC classifications aggregated into the seven 
large categories used in Table 5) and the year of the IPO. It has 
long been known that the number and types of firms making 
IPOs is cyclical. Unfortunately, though we cover a fifteen-year 
period, it is not quite a complete cycle. Nineteen ninety-six was 
already a fairly good year for IPOs and, after the collapse of the 
Internet Bubble, there was a slight recovery in the period from 
2004–2008. This was followed by a total collapse in 2008–2009, 
with a slight recovery in 2010 that was followed by a relatively 
strong 2011 (data not included in this report). We divided the 
pure Internet firms from other information and communication 
technology firms. Obviously, 1999–2000 were the years of 
an avalanche of Internet offerings and a large number of ICT 
offerings. Interestingly, at the height of IPO Bubble in 1999 and 
2000, most of the other sectors experienced a slowdown, though 
the services category firms may have reworked themselves to be 
“Internet” firms. Still, it is remarkable how all other categories 
were “crowded” out. However, with the collapse of the Bubble, 
IPOs in all categories collapsed, though the biomedical category 
recovered from 2004–2007, before being dragged down by the 
recent stock market collapse.
Historically, cyclicality has characterized U.S. stock markets’ 
receptivity to new firm offerings. The difficulty with this downturn 
has been the length of the drought. For venture capitalists, 
this meant a search for new sectors that might be attractive 
to markets. One sector that has been much remarked upon 
was “Clean Technology.” There have been some Cleantech 
IPOs; however, most of them have experienced poor post-IPO 
performance. More recently, in 2011, there have been a number 
of issuances of next-generation Internet firms. If this continues in 
2012, the IPO market will have made a sustainable recovery.
locations of firms  
undertaking IPos
The location of firms conducting IPOs in the United States is 
extremely concentrated in certain states (see Table 8) with more 
than 50 percent located in California, Massachusetts, New York, 
and Texas. California alone is home to 33 percent of the total. On 
a per-capita basis, Massachusetts had nearly twenty-two IPOs per 
million inhabitants12, which was far superior to any other state. 
California and Washington, D.C., followed with approximately 
sixteen per million inhabitants. Washington, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Maryland, and Minnesota comprised a third group with between 
seven and nine IPOs per million inhabitants (see Figure 7). 
What these results suggest is that there are marked 
differences between the states in terms of their ability to create 
new firms that grow sufficiently to be eligible for an IPO. In terms 
of being the home to IPO firms, jurisdictions normally considered 
to be business unfriendly, such as California, Massachusetts, and 
Washington, D.C., on a per-capita basis outperform states, such 
as Utah, Texas, and Florida, that are considered to be business-
friendly. While not examined further in this report, there may be 
an inverse correlation between business friendliness as measured 
in most studies. Also, the commonly used argument about 
there being a “weather” effect does not appear to be strongly 
supported by this data.
Table 7. Emerging Growth Company IPOs by Industry, 1996–2010
Class 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Biomedical 34 28 8 8 30 4 3 7 38 20 26 27 2 2 10 247 
ICT 59 72 40 70 73 11 3 5 13 9 11 22 1 3 6 398
Internet 8 13 21 200 91 1 4 4 13 10 9 13 1 7 7 402
Manufacturing 17 35 11 8 12 2 3 3 4 4 7 4 2 0 4 116
Other 53 51 29 26 35 10 2 9 14 12 6 10 2 2 8 269
Retail 25 24 17 6 4 0 2 1 3 3 0 3 0 0 3 91
Services 43 49 20 15 10 6 6 3 8 2 3 7 1 0 4 177
Total 239 272 146 333 255 34 23 32 93 60 62 86 9 14 42 1,700
12. This is the number of IPOs during the study period divided by the population in 2010.
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The location of venture capital-backed IPOs differs 
significantly from those not backed by VC. As Table 4 indicates, 
the San Francisco Bay Area garners almost 36 percent of all 
VC-backed IPOs, while being home to only 7 percent of the 
non-VC-backed IPOs. Oddly enough, California, as a whole, 
does quite poorly in terms of the ratio of non-VC-backed IPOs to 
VC-backed firms when compared to a number of other states. 
Within California, the Los Angeles area has more non-VC funded 
IPOs than those funded by VCs, as does Orange County. In many 
respects, this is so because industry funding patterns differ. For 
example, Texas has oil industry IPOs and those firms do not 
normally use VC as a source of funds.
Table 8. Headquarters Locations of Venture Capital and Non-Venture Capital-Financed Emerging Growth Company IPOs, 1996–2010
Region VC-Backed Percent of AllVC-Backed
Non-VC-
Backed
Percent of All 
Non-VC-
Backed
Percent 
of All
IPOs
California 452  46.4  141  19.4  34.9
 San Francisco Bay Area* 348  35.7  50    6.9  23.4
  Mountain View   30    3.1  4    0.6    2.0
  San Francisco   34    3.5  5    0.7    2.3
  San Jose   31    3.2  14    1.9    2.6
  Sunnyvale   47    4.8  4    0.6    3.0
 San Diego County   47    4.8  14    1.9    3.6
 Los Angeles County   24    2.5 35    4.8    3.5
 Orange County   15    1.5 26    3.6    2.4
Massachusetts 106  10.9 34    4.7    8.2
New York   45    4.6 82  11.3    7.5
 New York City   33    3.4 50    6.9    4.9
Texas   39    4.0 74  10.2    6.6
Florida   24    2.5 60    8.3    4.9
All Others 309  31.7  334  46.1  37.8
Total 975 100.0  725 100.0 100.0
* Includes the counties of Santa Clara, San mateo, San Francisco, Alameda, Contra Costa 
note: the percentages add up to more than 100 percent if one adds up all of the numbers in a column because the subsets of each state involve 
double-counting. Adding the percentages from each state gives 100 percent.
Figure 7. Emerging Growth Company IPOs per State and per Million Inhabitants, 1996–2010
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Remarkably, a few cities in the San Francisco Bay Area 
and, in particular, the region known as Silicon Valley, have had 
more IPOs than many states. To illustrate, the suburban city of 
Sunnyvale, with fifty-one IPOs, had more during this period than 
all but seven states. On a per-capita basis, this was 356 IPOs per 
million. Nearby Palo Alto, Calif., had 359 IPOs per million, but 
the smaller Mountain View had 446 IPOs per million. Outside the 
Silicon Valley region, Cambridge, Mass., led with 333 IPOs per 
million inhabitants. Interestingly, while Palo Alto and Cambridge 
are university towns, Mountain View and Sunnyvale are at the 
heart of Silicon Valley.
venture Capital Involvement
Venture capital has been singled out as a critical funder 
of new firms. Among EGC IPOs, venture capitalists funded 
more than 50 percent of the entire population. However, their 
involvement (as measured by a venture capital representative on 
their board of directors at the time of the IPO) differed markedly 
by industrial sector (see Table 9). They were most concentrated in 
the high-technology industries and least concentrated in retail, 
where self-financing may be more feasible. It was surprising that 
the highest concentration of firms with venture capitalists on 
the board of directors was medical instruments—a field where 
Basic Class Percent VC Class Components
Initial Public Offerings
VC-Backed Not VC-Backed All Firms
Internet 77.6% 312 90 402
Biotechnology 128 37 165
Medical Instruments 70 12 82
Biomedical   80.2%    198 49 247
  Software 87 43 130
Semiconductors 54 15 69
Communications 42 10 52
Telephone and Telegraph 28 20 48
Computer Systems 27 14 41
Computers 19 15 34
Electronic Equipment 15 9 24
ICT 68.3% 272 126 398
Retail Trade 19 41 60
Wholesale Trade 6 25 31
Retail 27.5% 25 66 91
Health Services 13 23 36
Business Services 13 17 30
Services 8 41 49
Computer Services 9 13 22
Computer Programming 18 22 40
Services 34.5% 61 116 177
Manufactured Goods 13 47 60
Machinery 5 22 27
General Instruments 16 13 29
Manufacturing 27.5% 25 66 91
Other   24    2.5 60    8.3    4.9
Total 57.4% 975 725 1,700
Table 9. Venture Capital Backing by Industry Class, Emerging Growth Company IPOs
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one might have thought that boot-strapping would have been 
feasible. Conversely, there were firms in all sectors that did not 
have venture capitalists on their boards of directors.
schumpeterian Innovation  
and IPos
In certain respects, the employment for some firms that 
have gone public does not represent their true impact. In Figures 
8 and 9, we illustrate this by presenting the employment and 
revenue growth of Amazon, eBay, and Google. These three 
firms are among the most successful of the Internet era and are 
examples of Schumpeterian innovation, whereby a firm or group 
of firms can contribute to the reorganization of entire economic 
sectors. Consider that eBay has become a massive marketplace 
with individuals and firms selling all manner of products globally. 
The full significance of this is difficult to gauge from either the 
employment or revenue, because eBay only captures a small 
fraction of the sales as revenue. Amazon, while different in that 
it has its own sales revenue, also has become an enormous 
marketplace through its Amazon Shops, which, though still a 
small source of overall revenue, are growing rapidly. Finally, there 
is Google, whose preponderance of revenues is from advertising, 
but whose impact on global information availability is difficult 
to overestimate. While these three firms are possibly the most 
noticeable, smaller firms such as Salesforce.com and Netflix have 
had significant impacts in their respective sectors. 
So, while these firms have experienced remarkable growth, 
their impact on the United States and even the global economy is 
far greater. They exemplify the idea of Schumpeterian growth. In 
the case of Amazon, this growth is, in many respects, an example 
of creative destruction, as many brick-and-mortar retailers 
experienced a new type of competition that may have contributed 
to their demise. In the case of eBay, it is more difficult to identify 
if previous economic activities were destroyed. Finally, in the 
case of Google, it is certainly possible that media that previously 
had been supported by advertising have been weakened, but 
many of the services that Google provides were previously 
unavailable. These three firms illustrate the complicated nature of 
Schumpeterian creative destruction and how equity markets can 
provide the capital that helps fuel their enormous growth.
Figure 8. Firm Revenue Growth for Amazon, eBay, and Google in Millions of 2009 Dollars
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Revenue per employee is an important indicator of the value 
created per employee. In Figure 10, we illustrate this pattern with 
three prominent companies, Amazon.com, eBay, and Google. 
What is evident is that, immediately after the IPO, revenue per 
employee dropped, which may be an outcome of the increased 
hiring with the influx of capital meant to fuel firm growth. In 
the case of these three firms, after the initial decline in revenues 
per employee, the revenues per employee began increasing. 
Amazon’s performance was particularly impressive as it began 
with the poorest relative performance of the group, but has been 
overtaking the leader of these three firms, Google, in terms of 
revenue (see Figure 8).
Figure 9. Firm Employment Growth for Amazon, eBay, and Google
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Figure 10. Revenues per Employee by Year in Thousands of 2009 Dollars, 1997–2010
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For purposes of comparison, Figure 11 shows median 
real revenue per employee over industry groups for the year of 
IPO and ten years after. For all operating firms, the median real 
revenue per employee ranges from just under $200,000 per 
employee to just under $250,000 per employee. This is well below 
the levels reached by Amazon and eBay in the years following 
their IPOs, and is very much below that achieved by Google. The 
biomedical firms had the lowest revenues per employee in the 
first years after their IPOs; however, after two years, revenues per 
employee increased quite significantly.
Proceeds
One reason that companies going public are able to rapidly 
add employees after the IPO is because they raise money in the 
IPO. The money that firms raise and invest would, presumably, 
be invested elsewhere in the economy if it did not go to the 
companies. In other words, there is no free lunch. In Table 10, we 
report that the average IPO during June 1996–December 2010 
raised $189 million in dollars of 2011 purchasing power, with an 
average of $162 million going to the company. EGCs on average 
raised $83 million, and other companies raised $289 million.
The $162 million raised per company, multiplied by the 
2,766 IPOs during our sample period, amounts to $448 billion. 
In Table 1, we report that 2.272 million jobs have been added by 
these companies after the IPO. If we make the heroic assumption 
that these companies raise no other money after the IPO, this 
works out to $197,000 per job created or, in round numbers, 
$200,000 per job.
IPOs from EGCs Others All IPOs 
June 1996–Dec. 2010 N=1,700 N=1,066 N=2,766 
Average Total Proceeds $89 mm $348 mm $189 mm
Average Percent Primary Shares 93% 83% 90%
Average Primary Proceeds $83 mm $289 mm $162 mm 
All proceeds numbers exclude over-allotment options and do not subtract 
the costs of raising capital, and are expressed in terms of January 2011 CPI 
purchasing power. Primary proceeds are the funds raised by the company 
from selling newly issued shares, and do not include proceeds raised by 
selling shareholders. the overall average primary proceeds of $162 million 
are calculated as the weighted average of the $83 million average for EGC 
IPOs and $289 million for other IPOs, and is thus less than 90 percent of the 
$189 million average total proceeds, due to the negative covariance of offer 
size and the percent of shares that are issued by the company.
Table 10. Average Inflation-adjusted Proceeds  
from Newly Issued Shares, in Millions
Figure 11. Median Revenue per Employee in Thousands of 2009 Dollars from the Year of the IPO  
to Ten Years after the IPO, Emerging Growth Company IPOs
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acquisitions and Post-IPo Growth
One important consequence of an IPO is that the now-public 
firm has stock that can be used to purchase other firms. This is 
particularly the case for firms whose stock has a high valuation. 
Acquisitions create difficulties for our analysis of post-IPO firm 
growth. For example, as of December 2011, Google had acquired 
more than 150 firms. Unfortunately, there is no way to measure 
the contribution of acquisitions to a firm’s total employment or 
revenue. For example, in 2010 Google purchased ITA Software 
for $700 million. According to press reports, ITA had somewhat 
less than 500 employees (Huang 2010). The number of these 
employees retained is unknown. Also, whether the employees 
acquired should be considered “jobs created” is a judgment. In 
the methodology section, this issue is discussed in greater detail. 
It is worth mentioning that nearly all of the acquisitions by the 
emerging growth companies are of other small young firms, so 
these may also be “new” jobs. However, this example illustrates 
how mechanical employment growth calculations may not be 
synonymous with “new jobs” created.
The fact that we do not distinguish between organic 
(internal) growth and acquisition-fueled growth results in the 
growth rate of aggregate employment for the IPO firms being 
higher than if we excluded acquisition-fueled growth. On the 
other hand, we do not adjust for reductions in employment due 
to divestures, and we assume that all firms that went bankrupt 
or delisted for distress reasons subsequently liquidated, and thus 
had their employment and revenues drop to zero. Thus, although 
we calculate that the 2,766 companies going public during June 
1996–December 2010 added 2.272 million employees after the 
IPOs, a more accurate statement might be 2.272 million plus or 
minus 500,000 employees.
Conclusion
Two thousand seven hundred sixty-six domestic operating 
companies conducted IPOs from June 1996–December 2010 in 
the United States. They employed 5.061 million people at the time 
of going public and added 2.272 million employees after the IPO, 
a post-IPO average increase of 822 employees per firm. In dollars 
of 2011 purchasing power, their combined annual revenue grew 
from $1.32 trillion prior to the IPOs to $2.58 trillion in fiscal 2010.
The average company going public raised $162 million in 
inflation-adjusted proceeds, not including an additional  
$27 million raised by selling shareholders. Since the average 
company going public created 822 jobs after the IPO, on average 
every job required an investment of $200,000.
The 1,700 emerging growth companies (EGCs) that went 
public during this period have, by the end of fiscal 2010, been 
responsible for employing more than 1.6 million people and 
generating more than $480 billion in annual revenues, with 
most of the jobs created after the IPO. From this time period, 
1,066 other IPOs, which are frequently of larger companies, are 
responsible for employing more than 5.6 million people and 
generating $2.1 trillion in annual revenue in 2010, although most 
of their employees were hired prior to going public. 
When we restrict our analysis to the 1,857 companies that 
went public during June 1996–December 2000, their combined 
employment grew by 60 percent over the following decade, a 
compound annual growth rate of 4.8 percent. For the EGCs that 
went public during this period, their combined employment grew 
by 161 percent, a compound annual growth rate of 10.1 percent, 
even though many of them were Internet companies that crashed 
and burned. Inflation-adjusted revenue grew at an even faster 
pace, reflecting capital investments and productivity improvements 
that generate higher standards of living.
With respect to sources of funding prior to the IPO,  
57 percent of EGC firms received venture capital funds, with 
VC funding concentrated in the information technology, 
communications, and biomedical industries, where it is present 
in approximately 75 percent of the IPOs. In other fields, such as 
manufacturing, retail, and services, it is far less prevalent.
In this report, we also calculate the survival rate of EGCs 
going public, and report that only 29 percent of these firms 
remain as independent public companies ten years after the 
IPO. Of those that do not survive, being acquired is much more 
common than going bankrupt.
We also examine the geographical distribution of the 
EGCs going public. There is an extraordinary concentration 
in California of firms undertaking IPOs. Despite California’s 
absolute dominance, it was Massachusetts that had the highest 
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per-capita number of IPOs. While New York and Texas also had 
significant numbers of IPOs, on a per-inhabitant basis, they were 
not as impressive. In addition to the relative under-performance 
of Southern states and, with the exception of Colorado, the 
Rocky Mountain states, the industrial Midwestern states of Ohio, 
Michigan, Indiana, and Wisconsin had few IPOs, despite being the 
homes to elite universities. The most interesting exception to this 
observation is Minnesota, which is in the top nine states in terms 
of per-inhabitant IPOs. Within states, there are regions, especially 
the San Francisco Bay and Greater Boston areas, that exhibit 
extremely high concentrations of IPOs. 
While aggregate statistics reporting revenue or employment 
increases provide valuable insights, there are particular firms 
in our population, such as Amazon, eBay, and Google, that are 
examples of Schumpeterian innovation, whereby a firm or group 
of firms can lead reorganizations of entire economic sectors. 
Their influence cannot be reduced to their internal performance. 
eBay has become a massive marketplace with individuals and 
firms selling all manner of products globally. Because eBay 
only captures a small fraction of the sales as revenue, its full 
significance cannot be gauged from either its employment 
or revenue numbers. Amazon has become one of the largest 
retailers in the world and has been a force for creative destruction 
that, again, cannot be fully captured in its employment and 
revenue numbers. Finally, there is Google, whose preponderance 
of revenues is from advertising, but whose impact on global 
information availability is difficult to overestimate. While these 
three firms are among the most noticeable, smaller firms such as 
Salesforce.com and Netflix also have had significant impacts in 
their respective sectors.
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